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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
IMPLIED WARRANTY IN SALE OF FOOD IN ORIGINAL
PACKAGE

By

RETAILER

In Bonenberger v. PittsburghMercantile Co., 28 A. 2d 913, it is held that a
housewife, who orders a can of oysters, impli-edly informs the dealer that she is
buying for human consumption as food and she is deemed to have relied upon the
dealer's skill and judgment in selecting the can of oysters delivered. Therefore, if
the can contains a piece of oyster shell, and the buyer is injured by swallowing it,
the dealer is liable, regardless of fault.
Liability is imposed on the theory of breach of an implied warranty. Justice
Parker writes the opinion and Justice Patterson writes a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Schaeffer joins.
In West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, decided in 1900 and so before the enactment in Pennsylvania of the Uniform Sale-; Act, it was held that a druggist could
not be held liable in an action of trespass for injuries resulting from the use of a
patent medicine, since he could not be deemed negligent in failing to analyze the
contents of each bottle or package he receives from the manufacturer. The possibility that he might be liable on an implied warranty, that he is not selling a deadly
poison disguised as a useful medicine, was not discussed. Perhaps the form of
action diverted the mind of the court from a consideration of this question. It
should not have done so. The liability of a retailer may "sound either in contract
or tort." The warranty is a "hybrid between tort and contract." 5 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed.) sec. 1505, page 4200. Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, 102 Pa. 156 and 106 Pa. 125, at page 141 and Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works of Pittsburgh, 102 Super. 515. Justice should not be administered according as plaintiff's attorney labels his action trespass or assumpsit. In the Barber
case, at page 163, it is conceded that trespass will lie for breach of an express
warranty and recovery may be had on proof of the contract, without more, and
on the other hand assumpsit will lie against the manufacturer in a suit by one
who purchased from a retail dealer. An injured party should not be required
to make an irrevocable election of some legal theory of liability and stand or
fall as the court may or may not approve this theory, when the facts show a
cause of action on another theory. 36 Dick. L. Rev. 106. "The remedies of
the injured consumer ought not be made to depend upon the intricasies of the
law xxx but on the sound demands of social justice." In the Nock case the
action was assumpsit, tried as if in trespass. After a trial on the merits, the
pleadings were deemed amended to conform with th- proofs. So, though the
action be trespass, recovery should be had on proof of breach of an implied warranty.
In Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co. 330 Pa. 257, at page 264, Justice Maxey said:
"It would, for example, be utterly impracticable and unreasonable to require grocers to open and analyze the contents of every can of food they sell. The purchaser
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in such cases does not expect any such precaution to be taken and relies wholly
upon the integrity, good faith and care of the person who put up the food in the
cans. The rule of the nonliability of vendors in 'original package' cases is firmly
established in the law." The court was speaking of liability ex delicto, as the
action was one of trespass. In the instant case the action was assumpsit and liability
is said to be imposed on the dealer by section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act. This
section, however, makes it a condition precedent that "it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment."
The court held that whether the oysters were in fact reasonably fit for human
consumption as food was a matter for the jury to pass upon but it appears to hold
that, in the sale of food to be put to immediate use, it is to be inferred that the
buyer does rely upon the seller's skill and judgment in sel'ecting the article delivered, and this regardless of whether the goods are or are not in "original packages." It is said: "The dealer is in a better position to know or ascertain the
reliability and responsibility of the packer than is the retail purchaser." But there
is nothing in the case to suggest that the packer of the oysters was not both reliable
and responsible. The better reason for the decision is simply one of social policy.
The injured party should have a remedy against the one who is within the reach
of legal process and the dealer should be indemnified by the negligent packer.
This is, of course, another case of imposing liability without fault but we have
become familiar with that under our workmen's compensation laws. True, the
consumer can carry accident insurance but the dealer can carry liability insurance
and add this to the price of his goods, as part of his overhead expenses. This will
involve fewer policies of insurance and give protection to the entire public, they
in turn really paying the cost of this protection. Obviously, it is now incumbent
upon all dealers to procure such insurance without delay, as they are in effect
insurers of their customers against injury from any article of food sold.
It is a curious fact that the court makes no reference to our act of May 4,
1889, P.L. 87, 69 P.S. sec. 123, "Historical Note." This act was not repealed by
the Sales Act, as was the Act of Apr. 13, 1887, P.L. 21, (see sec. 77 of Sales Act)
except in so far as it may be deemed inconsistent with the provisions of the Sales
Act. The 15th section of the Sales Act subordinates its provisions to "any statute
in that behalf" i.e. relating to the fitness of goods for a particular purpose. The
Superior Court regarded this act as in effect in sales of "food" but not in sales of
"drink." (Nock case, at p. 517) The act provides that "in every sale of articles
of merchandise, used wholly or in part for food, unless the parties shall agree
otherwise, there shall be an implied contract or undertaking that the goods or
merchandise are sound and fit for household consumption." This act does not
inject the question of reliance upon the seller's skill or judgment, as does the
Sales Act, and it indicates the legislative view of public policy in cases involving
sales of food. Williston comments on the fact that this Act of 1889 is still in
effect in Pennsylvania. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Rev. Ed., Vol. 4, sec. 996,
page 2743.
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Much that is found in the opinion is taken from the opinion of the majority
of the court in the leading case of Ward v. A. & P. Co., 231 Mass. 90, 5 A.L.R.
242 LEwis's CASES ON SALES, p. 271. The dissenting opinion in this case observes
that the effect of the decision is to charge dealers in food with liability as insurers,
and this is undoubtedly true. That this is dictated by several considerations of
public policy, see VOLD ON SALES, sec. 149, page 466.
Judge Hand has presented the arguments against imposing absolute liability
on the retailer of canned goods in Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519. He says:
"My own feeling is that protection to the public lies not so
much in extending the absolute liability of individuals, as in regulating lines of business in which the publc has a particular interest
in such a way as reasonably to insure its safety. In other words, pure
food laws, and rigorous inspection of meats, canning factories, and
other sources of food supply, would seem to me a much more effective way of protecting the public than by the imposition of the
liability of an insurer upon those who furnish food. The former
method corrects the evil at its source. The latter method only imposes an obligation in cases which ex hypothesi cannot be guarded
against by the individual by the exercise of due care. It shifts the
loss from the person immediately suffering injury to a person who
has neglected no precaution in supplying the food. This certainly
is not in accord with the general tendencies of the common law. I
am inclined to think that the imposition of such an obligation would
tend to lead in the long run to the prosecution of unfounded claims,
rather than to the protection of individuals or the public."
J. P. M.
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FRIGHT WITHOUT PHYSICAL INJURY UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

Decedent was employed as a sewing machine operator by M. While operating an electric power machine near a window, D was frightened by a. loud
clap of thunder and a flash of lightning. The latter did not enter the building.
Soon afterward D collapsed and upon examination, it was found she had suffered
a cerebral hemorrhage caused by an emotional disturbance. D died. The parents of D sought to enforce a claim for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Upon hearing before a referee, an award was made in
favor of the claimant on the basis of an injury caused by accident in the course
of employment. An appeal was taken to the Workmen's Compensation Board,
which modified the finding to the effect that D's injury was caused by emotional disturbance rather than direct physical contact but sustained the award.

On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the appellant's exceptions were sustained and judgment entered for him. Held: Emotional disturbance which is
unaccompanied by physical force, violence, or strain, is not the basis for an
award of compensation. Liscio v. Makrasky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483 (1942).
In laying down this rule, the Superior Court continued its policy of refusing to award compensation to employees under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736; as amended by Act of June 4, 1937, P. L.
1552, for injury arising from mere fright, in the absence of any actual physical
contact.
The Superior Court based its decision on the interpretation of Section 301
of the Act which provides: "The terms 'Injury' and 'Personal Injury,' as used
in this act, . . . shall be construed to mean only violence to the physical structure of the body, and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom;

and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this act, it
shall mean only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects..."
The court's interpretation turned on the meaning of the words "violence to the
physical structure." These words have been held to require an actual physical
contact and not a threatened application of force or emotional disturbance.
In this reasoning the court has been consistent while deciding previous
cases. In Hoffman v. Rhoades Const. Co., 113 Pa. Super. 55, 172 At. 33, the
decedent died after an argument with his foreman and no compensation was
allowed. In this case President Judge Keller said as follows: "One's purely
subjective emotions, the result of anger, grief, joy or other mental feeling, if
unaccompanied by physical force or exertion cannot be made the basis of a compensible accident under our Workmen's Compensation Law." In Fesenbeck v.
Philadelphia, 144 Pa. Super. 99, 18 Atl. (2d) 448, no recovery was allowed
for the death of a fireman who died as a result of steing a burned woman
carried from a blazing building.
In both these cases, however, a fact exists that is absent in the case under
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discussion. In the two cited cases the decedents were afflicted with heart disease and the emotional disturbance overtaxed already weakened organs and death
resulted. In the Liscio case, no facts of D's previous physical weakness appear
and D seemed to be a perfectly normal girl whose death was due to the pressure
on the auditory and optic nerves caused by the fear of lightning. The emotional disturbance was the substantial cause of the death and not the indirect and
mediate cause, acting upon an already weakened organism.
The Superior Court, however, apparently has decided to draw the line for
making awards for compensation in "fright" cases and did so. with "fright plus
physical contact," no matter how slight, as a marker. In Yunker v. Leechburg
S. Co., 109 Pa. Super. 220, 167 Atl. 443, an award was allowed where the
decedent had a splinter under his finger nail and died of fright when he saw
the doctor raise the knife with which to extract the splinter. The court said the
splinter was a sufficient physical contact on which to base an award. The distinction drawn in regard to the physical contact seems tenuous. The decedent
died from the fear of the treatment to be rendered and not from the splinter.
Nevertheless, the Court decided the fright was accompanied by physical contact
and this justified an award in the decedent's favor.
In further justifying its decision, the Court in the Liscio opinion makes
reference to the "Pennsylvania Law of Trespass for Negligence," which allows
no recovery resulting from mere fear or emotional disturbance apart from physical contact. To discuss the reason for this tort rule is not the purpose of this
discussion. It is enough to say that the situations are not analogous, since the
decisions imposing liability in workmen's compensation cases are more liberal
than those involving common law tort liability.
In the light of its previous decisions, the Court is consistent in reaching the
result of the instant case. Under the peculiar facts, however, existing in the
Liscio case-the fact that the fright, itself, substantially caused D's death-it
would appear socially and morally justifiable to award compensation to an employee dying under these circumstances. Opportunities for fraud would be few.
The employee's physical condition, prior to the death caused by fright without
physical injury, would be the distinguishing feature for an award of compensation. If the fright or emotional disturbance, causing death, acts upon an already
weakened physical condition, an award should not be allowed. But, if the
fright or emotional disturbance, causing death, acts upon a physically sound person and is a substantial cause of the death, then an award of compensation
should be allowed.
Thus, the Pennsylvania law in workmen's compensation cases allows no
recovery for fright in absence of physical injury. However, the rule should be
modified to include cases where fright in the absence of physical injury is the
substantial cause of the employee's death.
S. S. M.

